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KYBERNETIKA —VOLUME 17 (1981), NUMBER 2 
NORMALIZATION OF GENERAL COALITION-GAMES 
MILAN MAREŠ 
It is shown in the presented paper that the normalization concept used in the classical theory 
of games is senseful also for some important classes of general coalition-games. The normaliza-
tion of such games is connected with some difficulties caused by the general form and wide scale 
of possible types of the general characteristic function of the game. Even if the common concept 
of normalization applicable for all general coalition-games does not exist, the concepts of norma-
lization suggested here are suitable for many interesting and important types of coalition-games. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The normalization concept was introduced in the classical coalition-games theory, 
especially in the theory of coalition-games with side-payments, in order to create 
a proper tool for the comparison of different games. It enables to compare the pro-
perties and cooperation possibilities of coalition-games with the same (or equi-
valent) set of players by means of their normalized forms. 
The main problem investigated in the presented paper is whether there exists 
some analogical concept in case of the general coalition-games introduced in [2j. 
It is not difficult to see that any normalization of a general coalition-game is a trans-
formation of the imputations space. Such transformations were generally investigated 
in [5] and some of their further properties were introduced in [6]. The main results 
obtained in those papers imply also the possibilities and properties of the normaliza-
tion of general coalition-games. 
It is shown here that the normalization of the general coalition-games is not 
generally as simple as the normalization of the classical coalition-games with side 
payments. Not every general coalition-game can be normalized in senseful way, and 
even if the game can be normalized, there usually exist more equivalent normaliza-
tions of the same game. It means that the normalization of the general coalition-games 
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cannot be generally as important as the normalization of the side-payments coali-
tion-games. 
However, there exists a wide class of general coalition-games which can be nor-
malized and for which the normalization is also useful. That class is investigated here, 
and some of its main properties are introduced in the following sections. 
1. GENERAL COALITION-GAME 
The concept of the general coalition-game was suggested in [2]. Let us denote 
by R the set of all real numbers. Let us consider a finite and non-empty set /, and 
a mapping V of 2l into the class of subsets of the more dimensional real space R7 
such that for any se tKe2* the set V(K) c R7 fulfils the following conditions: 
(1.1) V(K) is closed; 
(1.2) if x = (Xi)ieIeV(K), y = (yi)ieIeR
I and Xi>yi for all ieK 
then y e V(K); 
(1.3) V(K) * 0, V(K) = R'oK = 0. 
Then the pair (/, V) is called a general coalition-game, or briefly a game, elements 
of the set / are called players, and the mapping Vis called a general characteristic 
function. 
Any set K e 2 z is called a coalition, and any partition of the set / into disjoint 
subsets is called a coalition structure. Any vector x e R7 is called an imputation. 
If K e 27 is a coalition then we introduce 
(1.4) V*(K) = {x = (x ;) ie / e R
7 :for all y = (yt)iEl e V(K) is either 
xi > y-i for some ieK or xt — j>; for all ieK], 
and the mapping V* of 27 into the class of subsets of R7 defined by (1.4) will be called 
a superoptimum function of the game (/, V). 
If Ji c: 27 is a class of coalitions then we denote 
v(jt) = n V(M) , V*(JI) = n V*(M) . 
MeJt MeM 
It was shown in [2] that for any coalition K e 21 is 
(1.5) V(K) u V*(K) = R7. 
An imputation x e R 7 is called strongly stable in the considered game (/, V) iff 
(1.6) x e V(X) for some coalition structure X <= 27 , and 
(1.7) xeV*(K) for all coalitions . K e 2 7 . 
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A coalition structure Jf c 2J is called strongly stable in the game (/, V) iff there 
exists a strongly stable imputation x e R1 such that x e V(X). 
It is useful to introduce here the following statements and concepts. 
Lemma 1. Let (J, V) and (I, W) be general coalition-games with the same set 
of players, and let x e R1 be an imputation such that x e V(jf) for some coalition 
structure Jf. Let us suppose that for every coalition K e 21 is V(K) cz W(K). If x 
is strongly stable imputation in the game (/, W) then it is strongly stable even in 
(I, V). 
Proof. It follows from the definitions of the general characteristic function V 
and superoptimum function V* that for any coalition K e 21 is 
(1.8) V(K) u V*(K) = R1 = W(K) u W*(K). 
Consequently, the assumption V(K) c W(K) implies that V*(K) => JV*(K) for any 
Kel1. If x e Rr is a strongly stable imputation in (I, W) then x e W*(K) for all 
K e 21, and by (1.8) is also x e V*(K) for all K e 2r. If x e V(X) for some coalition 
structure Jf" then x is strongly stable in the game (/, V), and the statement is 
proved. • 
Let (I, V) be a general coalition-game with a general characteristic function V. 
The game (I, V)is called super additive iff for any pair of disjoint coalitions K,Le 21, 
KnL=$, is 
(1.9) V(K u L) c V(K) n V(L). 
The game (/, V) is called subadditive iff for any pair of disjoint coalitions K,Le 21, 
K n L = 0 , is 
(1.10) V*(K u L) =5 V*(X) n V*(L). 
The game (/, V) is called additive iff it is superadditive and subadditive. 
The general characteristic function V is called convex iff all sets V(K), K e 21, are 
convex*). It is called concave iff the sets V*(K) are convex for all K e 21, and it is 
called linear iff it is convex and concave. 
2. TRANSFORMATIONS OF GAMES 
The normalization concept is based on the idea of a proper transformation of the 
considered game into another one with equivalent properties. Such transformations 
of games were investigated in [5] and [6]. 
The concepts and results presented in [5] which are frequently referred in the 
*) This convexity of the general characteristic functions is not equivalent to the convexity 
of the side-payments coalition-games known from the literature, e.g. from [8] or [7]. 
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following sections will be briefly mentioned here. However, also some other, less 
important, concepts from [5] will be referred in other sections of this paper, if 
necessary. 
Let us consider a set of players J and a one-to-one transformation T of R1 onto 
R1. If M <= R1 is a set of imputations then we denote 
(2.1) TM = {x e R7 : 3y e M such that x = Ty} . 
If x = (x ;) ie / then we denote by (Tx); the elements of the transformed vector Tx. 
The transformation Tis called a game-preserving transformation iff for any general 
coalition-game (I, V) the pair (I, TV), where for all K e 21 the set T V(K) is defined 
from V(K) by (2.1), is also a general coalition-game. The transformation Tis called 
a coordinate-wise strictly increasing transformation iff for any pair of imputations 
x,y eR1 and any iel the inequality x ; > y, implies (Tx); > (Ty);. 
It was proved in [5], Theorem 1, that a one-to-one transformation of R7 onto R7 
is a game-preserving one if and only if it is coordinatewise strictly increasing. 
Two general coalition-games (I, V) and (I, W) with the same set of players are 
called equivalent iff there exists a game-preserving one-to-one transformation T 
of R7 onto R7 such that 
(2.2) W(K) = T V(K) for all K e 21. 
The relation between the strong solutions of equivalent general coalition-games 
was investigated in [5], where the following results were derived. Let (J, V) be a gene-
ral coalition-game and let T be a game-preserving one-to-one transformation of R7 
onto R7. Then x e R7 is strongly stable in the game (7, V) if and only if Tx is strongly 
stable in (I, TV) ([5], Theorem 3). A coalition structure Jf c 27 is strongly stable 
in (I, V) if and only if it is strongly stable in (I, TV), ([5], Theorem 4). 
Let a = (a0,(ai)[Fl)eR x R
7 be a real-valued vector, and let a; > 0 for iel. 
Then we denote the hyperplane 
(2.3) Ha = { x 6 R
7 : X x ; a ; = a 0 } , 
iel 
and the halfspaces 
(2.4) H+a = {xeR
1:^xiai^a0}, 
iel 
H~ = { x e R 7 : Y > ; a ; g a 0 } . 
iel 
A general coalition-game (I, V) is called constrained iff for every coalition K e 21, 
every imputation x e V(K) and every player ieK there exists an imputation y e R7 — 
— V(K) such that y} = Xj for all j el, j 4= i, and yt > x ;. It was shown in [7], 
(hat if (I, V) is a constrained game and T is a game-preserving transformation then 
tl, TV) is also constrained. 
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A one-to-one transformation Tof R1 onto R' is called coordinatewise decompos-
able iff there exist transformations T, i el, of R onto R such that for any xe R1 
and any iel is TX; = (Tx);. A coordinatewise decomposable transformation T 
of R1 onto is called convex iff all partial transformations Thiel, are convex. 
Analogously, Tis called linear iff all transformations T; are linear, and Tis called 
concave iff all transformations T; are concave. 
It was proved in [5], Theorem 2, that any game-preserving transformation is 
coordinatewise decomposable. It was shown in [6] that if a general characteristic 
function V is convex and a game-preserving transformation T is concave then the 
general characteristic function TVis convex; if Vis concave and Tis convex then the 
general characteristic function TVis concave; if both, Vand Tare linear then TVis 
also linear (see [6]). 
3. 0-NORMALIZATION 
It is possible to consider more kinds of normalization of general coalition-games. 
One of the possibilities is to normalize the pay-off (the values of the general charac-
teristic function) of the minimal, i.e. one-element, coalitions. 
Definition 1. Let (I, V) and (I, W) be general coalition-games, and let for all iel be 
W({i}) = {xeR1 :xt ^ 0} . 
Then the game (/, W) is called a 0-normalization of the game (I, V) iff there exists 
a game-preserving one-to-one transformation T of R7 onto RJ such that W(K) = 
= T V(K) for all K e 21. The game (/, W) is called a 0-normalized game. 
The existence of the O-normalizations of general coalition-games is proved by the 
following theorem. 
Theorem 1. If (/, V) is a general coalition-game then there always exists its 0-nor-
malization. 
Proof. Condition (1.2) implies that for any general coalition-game (I, V) and any 
player / el there exists a real number a ; such that 
V({/}) = { x e R ' : * , . < ; a ( } . 
Let us define a one-to-one transformation Tof R' onto R1 such that for all x = (x,),s/ 
is (Tx); = x ; — ai for any / el. Then for all i el is 
TV({/}) = { y e R ' : 3 x e V ( { / } ) , y = T x } = 
= {y e R1: 3x e V({/}), xt S at, yt = xt - at} = 
= {yeR': yt + atS at} = {y e R
1 : y, ^ 0} . 
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The transformation T is a game-preserving transformation, as it is coordinatewise 
strictly increasing. It means that the game (I, TV) is a O-normalization of the game 
(I, V). D 
4. 1-NORMALIZATION 
Another of the generally possible attitudes to the normalization concept is to 
normalize the pay-offs (the values of the general characteristic function) of the largest 
possible coalition, i.e. of the coalition of all players. 
Definition 2. Let (I, V) and (I, W) be general coalition-games, let for any coali-
tion structure JT be W(X) a {x e R1 : £ *. ^ 1}, and let there exists al least one 
coalition structure ^ c 2 ' such that ,£l 
W(Se) n {x e R1: £ x, = 1} * 0 . 
isl 
Then the game (/, W) is called a {-normalization of the game (/, V) iff there exists 
a one-to-one game-preserving transformation T of R' onto R7 such that W(K) = 
= T V(K) for all iC e 2'. The game (/, FF) is called a l-normalized game. 
The existence of the 1-normalization for a wide class of general coalition-games is 
proved by the following statements. 
Theorem 2. Let (/, V) be a general coalition-game, and let there exists a coalition 
structure C/C a 2' such that V(jf) is a convex subset of R1, and for any coalition 
structure if c 2' is V(X~) c V(Z£). Then there exists a 1-normalization of the game 
(I, F). 
Proof. The convexity of the set F(jf) for some coalition structure JT means that 
there exists a real-valued vector (b0, (fc,)fej) e R x R
1, and a hyperplane 
i/b = {xeR ' : 5> j> i= &„}, 
ie/ 
such that bt > 0 for all i e 7, 
V(jf) c {x e R7 : X x;&; ^ 60} , 
lei 
and F ( J T ) n Hb =f= 0 (c.f. [6], Lemma 2). If fr0 > 0 then we may consider a trans-
formation Tof R' onto R' such that for every x e R1 and every i el is (Tx); = Xijb0. 
It is obvious that Tis coordinatewise strictly increasing one-to-one transformation 
of R' onto R', and that 




Ш ь = { y є Ä ' : Э x є Я ь , y = Tx} = { y є Я ' : £ y . = l } . 
iel 
If b0 ^ 0 then it is possible to construct a vector a e R
1 and a transformation U 
of R1 onto R' such that for every x e Rl and every i e I is a ; < fo0/n, where n is the 
number of elements of the set / , and (Ux); = xt - a;. Then U is a coordinatewise 
strictly increasing one-to-one transformation of RT onto R1, and 
U V(X) c {y e Rz : X >'i ^ c0} , U V(X) nUHb*0, 
ieX 
UHb = { y £ R ' : 3 x e / / b , y = Ux} = {y e R
1 : £ y, = c0} , 
where 
co = Ь0 - J! «І > Ь0 - (иb0)/и = 0 . 
Then the transformation T described above may be applied to the game (/, U V). 
It was shown in [6] that a composition of two game-preserving transformations is 
also a game-preserving transformation. Consequently, the pair (/, TUV) where 
for any K e 2' is 
TU V(K) = T(U V(K)) = { x e R ' : 3 y e V(K), x = Tz, z = Uy} 
is also a general coalition-game. It means that in both cases there was constructed 
a one-to-one game-preserving transformation of R1 onto R1 such that the transformed 
game fulfils the first condition of the 1-normalization. It was proved in [6] that 
for any coalition structure ££ such that V(£g) <= V(jf) is 
T V(Se) c T V(jf) c Ttfb or TU V(if) c TU F(jf) c TUHb 
in the first or second considered case, respectively. Consequently, the transformed 
game (/, TV) or (/, TUV) is a 1-normalization of the game (/, V). • 
Corollary. If (/, V)is a constrained convex and superadditive general coalition-game 
then there exists its 1-normalization. 
Theorem 3. If a general coalition-game (/, V) is subadditive then there always 
exists its 1-normalization. 
Proof. If (/, V) is a subadditive game then the assumptions of Theorem 2 are 
fulfilled. The coalition structure JT fulfilling the assumptions of that theorem is the 
coalition structure of exactly all one-element coalitions. • 
It is not difficult to see that the definitions of the O-normalization and 1-normaliza-
tion may be easily generalized. Let a = (at)isI e R
1 be a real-valued vector, and let 
(/, V) and (/, W) be equivalent general coalition-games. Let us denote by Tthe game-
I l l 
preserving one-to-one transformation of R1 onto R1 for which W(K) = T V(K) 
for all K e 21. Then the game (7, W) could be called an o-normalization from below 
of (I, V) iff for all i e / i s 
W({i}) = {xeR'-.Xt g a,}. 
Let us consider a hyperplane 
Hb = { x e R ' : y > ^ = b0} 
for some real-valued vector b = (b0, (b)iEl) e R x R
1 such that bt > 0 for all i e7 . 
Then the game (I, W) could be called a b-normahzation from above of the game 
(I, V) iff for all coalition structures X c 27 is PV(jf) c H;/, and for at least one 
coalition structure S? cz 2J is fF(i?) n Hb + 0. 
Such generalization of Definitions 1 and 2 would be a formal one, only. It can be 
easily shown that if a general coalition-game is an o-normalization form below 
of a game (I, V) for some a e R1 then there exists another coalition-game which is 
a O-normalization of (/, V). Analogously, for any b-normalization from above of 
a game (I, V) there exists another equivalent game which is a 1-normalization of 
(I. n 
5. (OA)-NORMALIZATION 
The most desirable kind of normalization of the general coalition-game is the one 
normalizing in certain sense all pay-offs in both senses — "from above" and "from 
below", i.e. normalizing the payments of the smallest one-player coalitions and the 
largest all-players coalition. This normalization is senseful especially for the games 
which are superadditive, subadditive or additive in which the pay-offs of all coalitions 
are really limited by the pay-offs of the smallest and largest ones. 
The (0, ̂ -normalization introduced in this section is a natural combination of the 
previous two kinds of normalization introduced in Sections 3 and 4. 
Definition 3. Let (I, V) and (I, W) be general coalition-games. Then the game 
(I, W)is called a (O,l)-normalization of the game(i, V) iff it is both, the O-normaliza-
tion and the 1-normalization of (/, V). The game (I, W) is then called also a (0,1)-
normalized game. 
It can be easily seen that for most of the general coalition-games which can be 
0-normalized, 1-normalized or (OA)-normalized there exist more game-preserving 
one-to-one transformations of R1 onto R1 fulfilling the conditions of the respective 
type of normalization. It means that there exist more games which are the O-normali-
zation, 1-normalization or the (O,l)-normalization of a given game. Results proved 
in [5] and mentioned also in Section 2 of this paper imply that all such normaliza-
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tions are equivalent in the sense of [5] and that there exists a strong correspondence 
between their solutions. 
Remark 1. If (7, V) is a general coalition-game, and if (7, W0), (I, W^) and (/, 
W{0yi) are its O-normalization, 1-normalization and (OA)-normalization, respectively, 
then all the games are equivalent, and (/, W0) is a O-normalization of (/, Wt) and 
(I, Wl0tl)), (I, Wi) is a 1-normalization of (/, W0) and (/, Wi0il)), and (/, Wi0A)) is 
a (OA)-normalization of (T W0), and (7, Wx), too. 
The existence of the (OA)-normalization of a game (/, V) depends especially on the 
existence of its 1-normalization, as follows immediately from Theorem 1. The results 
formulated in Theorems 2 and 3 can be completed by the following statements inte-
resting especially for the case of the (OA)-normalization. 
Theorem 4. Let (/, V) be a general coalition-game, let there exists its 1-normaliza-
tion (I, W), and let for x e R1 be 
xen*V ({ ' } )=>I> i< l -
iel iel 
Then there exists a (OA)-normalization of (/, V). 
Proof. If (/, W)is a 1-normalization of (/, V)then there exists a hyperplane 
H = { x £ j ? ' : ^ i i = l} 
iel 
such that, according to the assumptions of this statement, 
(5.1) n W({i}) n H = (/) and n W({i}) c {x eR7 : £ x, < 1} . 
iel iel iel 
Let us denote by a = (a^ut the real-valued vector for which 
W({i}) = {x e R7 : xt < a,} for all iel. 
Then (5.1) and the assumptions of this theorem imply that 
(5.2) Y>i < 1 , i.e. a$H . 
iel 
Let us define a mapping S of R7 onto R7 such that for all x e R7 and all ielis (Sx)t = 
= Xj — at. The mapping S is a game-preserving mapping, as it is coordinatewise 
strictly incteasing, and consequently, the pair (/, SW) is a general coalition-game. 
Moreover, (J, SW) is a O-normalization of (/, W) and of (/, V). Let us denote by SH 
the hyperplane 




1 - I «, * 0 , 
iel 
as follows from (5.2). Then there exists a mapping U of R7 onto R7 such that for all 
y e R1 and all j e / is 
(->).«>•./(--;>>.)• 
It is not difficult to verify that U is a one-to-one and game-preserving mapping 
of R' onto R7 such that the game (/, USW) is a O-normalization and 1-normalization 
of (/, W). If we denote by Tthe game-preserving transformation for which W(K) = 
= T V(K) for all K e 2l then Theorem 5 from [5] implies that the composed mapping 
UST of R7 onto R7 is also a game-preserving one-to-one mapping, and the game 
(/, USW) = (/, USTV) is a (0, ̂ -normalization of the game (/, V), and also of the 
games (/, W) and (/, SW). • 
Corollary. If the game (/, V) is superadditive but not additive, and if there exists 
its 1-normalization then there exists its (OA)-normalization as follows from the 
previous theorem. 
Remark 2. It can be easily seen that no subadditive general coalition-game can be 
(OA)-normalized. 
The (0,l)-norma'ization of any general coalition-game is equivalent to the original 
game. It means that the general properties of the game-preserving transformations 
introduced in [5] and [6] can be applied, and that the normalization can be chosen 
in such a way that it preserves some important properties of the transformed games. 
Theorem 5. Let (/, V) be a general coalition-game, and let there exists a (0.1)-
normalization of (/, V), Then the general characteristic function V is convex, concave 
or linear if and only if there exists a (OA)-normalization (/, W) of (/, V) such that 
the general characteristic function W is convex, concave or linear, respectively. 
The game (/, V) is constrained if and only if there exists its (O,l)-normalization which 
is constrained. 
Proof. If there exists a (O,l)-normalization of the game (/, V) then the game-
preserving transformation transforming (/, V) into the (0,l)-normalized game is 
is always coordinatewise decomposable, as follows from [5], Theorem 2. Then there 
exists a transformation Tof R7 onto R7 transforming (/, V) into a (0,l)-normalized 
game (/, W) such that T is a combination of a few linear transformations, namely 
the shift transformation 5 such that for any x e R7 and any i e / is 
(Sx)i = Xj -t~ a, , where at e R , 
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and the scale transformation U such that for any x e R' and any i el h 
(Ux); = fc;X;, where bt e R , b, > 0 . 
Both of these transformations are linear. It means that their combination is also 
a linear, coordinatewise increasing transformation, and consequently, the pair 
(J, W) is a general coalition-game and, moreover, theorems from [6] imply the first 
part if the statement. As the game-preserving transformation of (J, V) onto its 
(O,l)-normalization is coordinatewise strictly increasing, the constrainedness of the 
transformed game is equivalent to the same property of the original game (7, V), as 
follows from [6]. D 
Remark 3. An analogous theorem can be easily proved even for the O-normaliza-
tion and 1-normalization of a game (/, Vj. 
If a game with linear characteristic function is considered then the following 
statement describing the properties of the maximal coalition in superadditive games 
holds. 
Theorem 6. If (I, V) is a superadditive general coalition-game with linear general 
characteristic function V and 1-normalized, then 
(5.3) V(J) = { x e R ' : X > ; < ; i } . 
iel 
Proof. Since (/, V) is 1-normalized, then for all coalition structures X and all 
imputations x e V(jf) is 
iel 
and there exists a coalition-structure if and an imputation y e V{!£) such that 
l 3 ' , = l . 
iel 
The superadditivity of (J, V) implies that the coalition structure if fulfilling the 
preceding condition is the coalition structure {/} formed exactly by the all-players 
coalition I. The linearity of the considered coalition-game (j, V) means that both 
sets V(I)and V*(/) are convex subsets of R;. Then (1.5) implies the validity of (5.3). • 
It was already mentioned above that any general coalition-game and its ©-nor-
malization, 1-normalization and (0, ̂ -normalization are equivalent in the sense 
defined in [5] and introduced also in Section 2. It means that there also exists a strong 
correspondence between their solutions. This correspondence was proved in [5], 
Theorems 3 and 4, and it was briefly mentioned also in Section 2. The following 
results concern some more special properties of the strong solutions of the normalized 
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games which can be used, according to the equivalence property, even for the in-
vestigation of the properties of some further general coalition-games. 
Lemma 2. Let (I, V) be a 1-normalized superadditive general coalition-game such 
that 
V(I) = {x e R; : £ Xi ^ 1} . 
iel 
If x e RJ is a strongly stable imputation in the game (I, V) then £ xt = 1. 
iel 
Proof. If x is strongly stable in (I, V) then, by definition, there exists a coalition-
structure 3t such that x e V(X~), and x e F*(/C) for all K e 21. Hence, x e V*(l), 
too. and also x e F(j) => V(JT). As 
F(J) = {xeR'-.^XtS 1} , and 
is/ 
F*(7) = {x e Rr : Y > ; § 1} , 
ief 
the inequality £ x ; = 1 is necsssarily true. • 
iel 
Theorem 7. Let (I, F)and(7, W) be (OA)-normalized superadditive general coali-
tion-games such that 
V(I)=W(l)={xeR':lxi^l}, 
iel 
and such that V(K) e W(K) for all coalitions K e 21. Let x E Rt be an imputation. 
If x is strongly stable in the game (I, W) then it is strongly stable also in (I, V). 
Proof. This theorem follows immediately from Lemma 1, where the coalition 
structure X for which x e V(jf) is yf = {/}, as follows from Lemma 2. • 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The general coalition games include a relatively rich class of more special coalition-
games, and their normalization is not as easy as the normalization of the classical 
coalition-games with side-payments. For some special cases the normalization does 
not exist or is not natural for their structure. However, it exists and it is senseful 
for some interesting and important subclasses of the considered class of games. 
Some properties of the normalizations of general coalition-games were introduced 
in the previous sections. Some other properties may be derived in case of necessity 
for some more limited and more specialized games. It concerns, especially, the pro-
peties of the strong solutions of the normalized games which especially depend on the 
actual form of the general characteristic function of the considered game. 
(Received May 12, 1980.) 
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